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Abstract – Nowadays biometrics is being used in many 
applications where security is required. This fact causes that 
new threatens have appeared and that the number of attempts 
to break biometric systems has increased. From all potential 
attacks, those involving damage or thefts to users are the most 
worrying. Most of them could be avoided if acquisition sensors 
would have suitable approaches for aliveness detection at the 
capture process. Many providers claim that their products 
support these methods but unfortunately it has been 
discovered that some products do not detect fake samples. In 
this paper a methodology based on Common Criteria is given 
to evaluate, in an independent way, whether biometric capture 
devices implement methods for fake samples detection, and till 
which extent such methods are effective. This methodology 
has been tested with sensors from different modalities. 
Index Terms — Biometrics, Aliveness Detection, Fake 
Samples, Evaluation Methodology   
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Currently the use of Biometrics is increasing as a method to 
provide security at the identification stage in applications. 
Following this raise in popularity, new threats have appeared. 
One of the most important is the use of fake samples to 
overcome the identity verification step. These fake samples 
can be obtained from genuine users by different means. One 
of them is to make an artificial sample similar to a personal 
characteristic taking the latent information from a previous 
presentation. Another way is taking by force a real but not life 
sample. This last alternative is the reason why many people 
are worried about their personal safety. In order to avoid users 
to be injured and/or security applications to be overcome, 
biometric systems must provide mechanisms for aliveness 
detection.  
There have been few works related to aliveness detection. 
One of the most popular is the work published by L. Thalheim, 
J. Krissler and P. Ziegler [1]. This study tested eleven 
biometric products, analyzing their ability to resist potential 
attacks. Products analyzed were from different modalities: nine 
products for fingerprint, one for face and one for iris. They 
tested the use of fake samples or the reactivation of latent 
images. Other well known experiments are the ones carried 
out by T. Matsumoto [2] [3], related to "gummy" fingers and iris 
samples. A. Pacut and A.Czajka [4] have also worked with iris 
forgeries. Matsumoto proved that commercial fingerprint 
systems implemented means to reject artificial fingers, but 
when the technology for building that fingers was changed, 
and “gummy” fingers are built, then they were not able to 
detect the lack of aliveness. In addition, both Matsumoto and 
A. Pacut and A.Czajka made forgery iris using different 
printers and resolutions to present the samples at different 
cameras. All of these works disclose that aliveness detection is 
not enforced in may biometric systems, dealing to the fact that 
many sensors and algorithms are not able to reject artificial or 
false samples.  
In all these studies, simple suitable methods for each 
modality were applied to test each sensor. Neither of them 
followed an evaluation methodology. Each author implements 
his own approach to demonstrate how biometric sensors are 
not able to deny fake samples. 
In this work, a generic methodology for aliveness detection 
testing will be shown. Such methodology is based on CEM 
(Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology), and will be used 
for testing the security level achieved by Biometric Systems.  
Next section introduces CEM methodology to analyse 
vulnerabilities and Section III describes how to adapt such 
methodology to biometric products. The remaining parts 
explain the complete procedure applied to sensors from 
different modalities. Finally, evaluation results and conclusions 
will be presented.  
II.  CEM METHODOLOGY
CC (Common Criteria) [5] establishes a common base to 
evaluate security properties of IT products. This multi-part 
standard is composed by a set of functional and assurance 
requirements and specific methods to evaluate them. Such 
methods are detailed at CEM [6]. An evaluation based on CC 
consists on testing that a certain TOE (Target of Evaluation)
meets all functional and assurance requirements defined in a 
ST (Security Target), following CEM specific procedures. 
One of the most important assurance requirements is the 
analysis of vulnerabilities (class AVA_VAN). This requirement 
is included in all evaluations regardless of the EAL (Evaluation 
Assurance Level) chosen for them. Only some details 
regarding effort, rigour and depth will change depending on the 
EAL chosen. For an enhanced-basic potential attack (EAL4), 
the methodology specified at CEM request the following Inputs 
to be obtained before evaluation: 
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 The ST 
 Documentation related to the TOE (design, guidance 
documentation, functional specification, etc.) 
 The TOE suitable for testing 
 Information publicly available to support the 
identification of possible potential vulnerabilities. 
Then, the evaluation can take place, by the execution of the 
following Actions: 
1) TOE configuration and test environment 
Previously to real evaluation, test equipment, environment 
and device configuration, has to be defined according to 
the evaluation specification defined in the ST. In addition, 
TOE shall be installed and its current state known. 
2) Examine the TOE and sources of information
In CEM methodology this part is based on a search of 
vulnerabilities following a methodical analysis. Based on 
papers, public documentation, proceedings, conferences 
and/or other documentation used in the evaluation, TOE 
design and its implementation are studied in order to find 
potential vulnerabilities. Once all vulnerabilities have been 
identified, evaluator has to select which ones could be 
exploitable considering the ST, operational environment 
and potential attacks.  The rest of them are declared as 
residual vulnerabilities and it will be not evaluated.   
3) Define penetration test 
Afterwards evaluator has to define a series of test cases 
for all exploitable vulnerabilities. From such cases, 
evaluators should determinate the susceptibility of TOE to 
each applicable vulnerability. Enough documentation 
containing any considerations, have to be developed in 
sufficient detail to guarantee repeatability.  
4) Perform  penetration tests and record test results  
Evaluator has to carry out all penetration tests declared 
following the approaches previously defined and save all 
results obtained during the evaluation. 
5) Report results 
At the end of the evaluation activity, evaluators have to 
document all steps, considerations and results of each 
penetration test. These reports have to include the verdict 
of TOE resistance to the type of attacks considered in the 
analysis of vulnerabilities. 
III.  EVALUATION METHODOLOGY FOR BIOMETRIC
SYSTEMS
As any other IT product, biometric systems can be 
evaluated following CC. However, due to special features of 
them, it is necessary to consider particular details when 
biometrics products are going to be analysed. In order to 
evaluate this kind of products according to the analysis of 
vulnerabilities previously mentioned, authors suggest the next 
procedure. This procedure will be defined generically for all 
biometric modalities. 
Consider the following specific inputs: 
 Biometric system and its respective acquisition 
device
 Biometric system guidance documentation 
 Documentation publicly available of any potential 
vulnerability 
 A set of users 
 Material to create forgeries  
 Measurement instruments 
Then perform the following actions: 
1) Define evaluation objectives and  TOE characteristics 
In CC this is already included at ST and/or TOE 
documentation before vulnerabilities analysis is done. For 
this evaluation we have not such documents so it has to 
be specified in detail at the very first moment. Hence, 
objectives, assumptions and operational environment 
have to be defined before evaluation. Furthermore a 
generic study of the acquisition device has to be carried 
out. Such study has to include at least: sensor modality, 
type of data captured (image, audio stream, raw data, 
etc), main sensor features and how it operates. It has to 
be identified which sensor parameters are used to capture 
and recognize such sample like one belonging to the 
modality under study. In addition at the first step of 
evaluation, measure instruments have to be calibrated, 
TOE has to be installed and configured in operational 
environment and also necessary users and materials 
have to be prepared. A simple trial of enrolment and 
verification process must be done to assure biometric 
system works correctly. 
2) Search and identify potential vulnerabilities 
Knowing all data mentioned above, a list of potential 
vulnerabilities has to be done. After that, all exploitable 
vulnerabilities have to be identified. In addition those non-
exploitable and residual vulnerabilities have to be properly 
justified. 
3) Design penetration test 
In accordance with exploitable vulnerabilities identified at 
previous phase, penetration tests have to be described. 
These tests have to include the entire procedure to 
perform them and it has to be repeatable. Such tests 
have to describe its purpose and vulnerability under test, 
attack mode and how to create fake samples. These have 
to cover all phases (enrolment and verification), specifying 
how to present sample to sensor, defining results to be 
saved and any relevant aspect related to the particular 
modality under study. 
4) Carry out penetration tests 
Penetration tests previously described have to be 
performed. All tests have to be carried out although one 
test can disclose possible results of others. This is 
because we never know the resources of an attacker 
and/or how he/she works. It is possible that it is easier for 
him/her to execute a complex attack instead a simple 
one. For the same reason, the execution order of these 
tests is not relevant. At this part of the evaluation, all 
results specified for each test have to be saved. Also, 
unexpected results have to be recorded in order to 
analyse its cause at the next phase..  
5) Generate reports 
From all data obtained during evaluation, reports have to 
be generated where proofs and results are presented. 
Such reports should include at least: 
1) A description of the tested biometric system:
modality, type of comparison system (verification or 
identification), a brief description of capture sensor 
and how it works.
2) For each penetration test:
a) Vulnerability to be analyzed and the 
purpose of the test.
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b) Type of fake samples, its special features 
and how each sample was generated.
c) Number of users that have taken part at the 
test, how many behave as genuine users 
and how many as impostors.
d) Results in each phase.
IV.  EVALUATION OBJECTIVES AND TOE
CHARACTERISTICS
In this paper, authors analyse if biometric acquisition 
sensors have implemented valid methods to detect fake 
samples. Some commercial devices of two biometric 
modalities are being evaluated: one vascular system and three 
fingerprint based sensors.  This global objective involves all 
remarks explained below. 
A.  Objectives 
TABLE I  
OBJECTIVES OF EVALUATION 
O.ALIVENESS_ 
DETECTION
The main objective is analysing if 
biometric systems have implemented 
aliveness detection methods and can 
reject fake samples (e.g. synthetic, 
dead, latent or imitation samples).
O.SENSOR Only attacks launched directly against 
the biometric sensor are going to be 
evaluated in order to test if sensor 
and/or biometric system have 
implemented aliveness detection.
B.  Assumptions
TABLE II 
ASSUMPTIONS OF EVALUATION 
A.USER User is not hostile. 
A.ADMIN Administrator is not hostile. 
A.QUALITY We consider that sample quality is 
analysed directly by the sensor or in a 
later process but quality is not going to 
be covered in this evaluation. If a fake 
sample is rejected by quality, result will 
be as if the sensor has counteracted 
this vulnerability either by means of 
quality or aliveness detection methods. 
A.VERIFICATION In order to simplify the evaluation, only 
biometric system in verification mode 
will be analysed. 
A.ATTACK For vulnerability analysis, authors have 
considered an enhanced-basic attack 
potential. 
C.  Others considerations
Operational environment for the evaluation presented in this 
paper is standard laboratory conditions, both in temperature 
and humidity. Ambient illumination is fluorescent light. 
D.  TOE characteristics
Biometric sensors and target modalities are detailed in 
Table III. Only technical and relevant features are mentioned. 
Companies and sensor trade names will not be disclosed in 
order to keep its confidentiality.   
TABLE III 
TOE CHARACTERISTICS
VASCULAR PATTERN 
S.VASCULAR This sensor is based on near-infrared light 
to capture the vein pattern image. The 
deoxidized hemoglobin in the blood palm 
veins absorbs this kind of light and forms a 
unique pattern for each user. It works in a 
non-invasive way because sensor takes the 
image at low distances. 
FINGERPRINT 
S.FINGERP_A It is an optical high resolution sensor (> 500 
dpi) with a large sensing area (> 400 mm2).
Optical sensor use visible light to illuminate 
the surface of finger and get a digital 
photography. User just has to touch 
sensible area. This kind of sensor is very 
susceptible to dirt, skin type or humidity. 
S.FINGERP_B It is a silicon sensor with a resolution of 500 
dpi and a sensible area of 230 mm2. This 
sensor uses capacitance to get fingerprint 
image. As S.FINGERP_A, user just has to 
touch sensible area and its operation could 
change with dirt, humidity and damaged 
skins.
S.FINGERP_C It is a swipe fingerprint sensor with an 
image resolution of 500 dpi. Sensor array is 
of 192 column x 8 row and its acquisition 
rate is more than 3,700 frames per second. 
As the previous sensor, It works based on 
the capacitance principle too, but its use it is 
completely different. Users have to slide 
his/her finger over the sensible area at a 
certain speed. 
V.  POTENTIAL THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES 
Several threats could affect the entire biometric systems and 
decrease its security. Considering only attacks directed 
against the capture device (O.SENSOR) and analysing 
papers, proceedings and public documentation (e.g. [2], [7] 
and [8]), the threats found are the ones stated in Table IV. 
TABLE IV 
POTENTIAL THREATS 
AUTHORIZED USER 
T.UNKNOWNGLY Biometric sample is stolen from user 
without his/her knowledge. 
T.WILLINGLY User presents voluntarily his/her own 
biometric reference. 
T.UNWILLINGLY User is forced to present his/her 
biometric reference. 
235
Authorized licensed use limited to: Univ Politecnica de Madrid. Downloaded on October 27, 2009 at 08:40 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
T.DEAD Biometric sample is obtained by mean 
of killing user or amputating his/her 
biometric reference. 
T.MODIFY Modify his/her own sample during 
enrolment in order to facilitate an 
impostor attack. 
IMPOSTOR 
T.OWN_SAMPLE Presenting his/her own sample in a 
zero-effort attempt. 
T.IMP_MODIFY Modifying his/her own sample. 
T.CLONE Using a clone (e.g. twins). 
T.FAKE Presenting a fake sample. 
T.LATENT Reactivating a latent sample. 
T.REPLAY Replay attacks. 
T.ENVIRONMENT Modifying environment conditions 
T.HILL_CLIMBING Hill-climbing attack 
Compared to previous attacks the system presents the 
following vulnerabilities or weaknesses: 
TABLE V 
VULNERABILITIES 
V.SYNTHETIC If biometric system is unable to 
detect fake samples (e.g. latex 
hands, gummy fingers) 
V.DEAD Unable to detect dead or 
amputated samples. 
V.RESIDUAL Unable to detect residual or latent 
samples. 
V.IMITATION Unable to detect forgeries (e.g. 
photographics or videos). 
V.QUALITY Unable to detect low quality 
samples and/or degraded 
samples. 
V.MULT_CAPTURE Allowing many consecutive 
acquisitions or without a limited 
the number of attempts per user. 
V.USER_THREATEN Unable to detect a threaten user 
or not. 
V.USER_HOSTILE If user is hostile. 
V.ADMIN_HOSTILE If administrator is hostile. 
V.OUTPUT If biometric system shows scores 
or other kind of results from some 
information could be obtained. 
V.FAR If the false acceptance rate of the 
biometric system allows impostors 
to access. 
There is a relationaship between attacks and vulnerabilities. 
This is shown in Table VI: 
TABLE VI 
CROSS-TABLE BETWEEN ATTACKS AND VULNERABILITIES 
CORRESPONDENCE
BETWEEN 
ATTACKS AND 
VULNERABILITIES 
V.
D
EA
D
 
V.
SY
N
TH
ET
IC
 
V.
R
ES
ID
U
AL
 
V.
IM
IT
AT
IO
N
 
V.
Q
U
AL
IT
Y 
V.
M
U
LT
_C
AP
TU
R
E 
V.
U
SE
R
_T
H
R
EA
TE
N
 
V.
U
SE
R
_H
O
ST
IL
E 
V.
AD
M
IN
_H
O
ST
IL
E 
V.
O
U
TP
U
T 
V.
FA
R
 
T.UNKNOWNGLY  X X X        
T.WILLINGLY        X    
T.UNWILLINGLY       X     
T.DEAD X           
T.MODIFY        X X   
T.OWN_SAMPLE     X      X
T.IMP_MODIFY     X      X
T.CLON     X      X
T.FAKE  X  X        
T.LATENT   X         
T.REPLAY      X     X
T.ENVIRONMENT     X      X
T.HILL_CLIMBING     X     X X
Assuming that users and administrator are not hostile 
(A.USER and A.ADMIN), all attacks mentioned above have to 
be counteracted by the overall biometric system.  
Removing vulnerabilities related with performance (V.FAR), 
quality (V.QUALITY) and results (V.OUTPUT), the rest of 
them could be avoided if acquisition sensors have the 
capability to detect fake samples. 
Considering the objectives and assumptions defined at the 
beginning of the evaluation, a classification of vulnerabilities is 
presented in Tables VII, VIII and IX. 
TABLE VII 
EXPLOITABLE VULNERABILITIES 
V.SYNTHETIC 
V.DEAD 
V.IMITATION 
These three vulnerabilities are included as 
exploitable vulnerabilities because all of 
them meet with the objectives 
O.ALIVENESS_DETECTION and 
O.SENSOR. 
V.LATENT  
(Fingerprint) 
This vulnerability satisfies the objectives of 
the evaluation but only for fingerprint 
modality where the biometric reference can 
laid down on the sensor. 
TABLE VIII 
NOT EXPLOITABLE VULNERABILITIES 
V.USER_THREATEN Sensor and algorithms may have 
implemented methods to detect 
threaten users. This vulnerability 
should be analyzed if we consider 
O.SENSOR objective however, this 
is out of the scope of this evaluation 
because of the 
O.ALIVESSNES_DETECTION 
objective.
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V.USER_HOSTILE This vulnerability is not exploitable 
due to A.USER assumption.
V.ADMIN_HOSTILE In the same way, this vulnerability is 
not exploitable because of A.ADMIN 
assumption.
V.OUTPUT
V.FAR 
Both vulnerabilities are not 
exploitable because only 
vulnerabilities related to aliveness 
detection are evaluation targets 
(O.ALIVENESS_DETECTION).
V.QUALITY This vulnerability is not exploitable 
according to A.QUALITY 
assumption.
The rest of vulnerabilities are classified as residual 
vulnerabilities because authors believe that it not be possible 
to be carried out within an enhanced-basic attack potential. 
TABLE IX 
RESIDUAL VULNERABILITIES 
V.MULT_CAPTURE Sensor and subsequent process 
algorithms must detect replay attacks. 
These attacks are a way of inject fake 
samples to biometric system and 
could be avoided if aliveness detection 
methods are implemented. But these 
attacks need particular equipment and 
knowledge to perform them. That is 
why authors consider this vulnerability 
having a attack potential higher than 
enhanced-basic (A.ATTACK). 
V.LATENT  
(Vascular Pattern)
This vulnerability is included like a 
residual vulnerability for vascular 
biometrics because this biometric 
reference is located inside the human 
body. In order to reactivate a latent 
sample, attackers need to find register 
where image has been recorded and 
recover it. This action requires special 
equipments and a wide knowledge of 
the system so this vulnerability has an 
attack potential higher than enhanced-
basic (A.ATTACK).
VI.  GENERAL PENETRATION TEST FOR
EXPLOITABLE VULNERABILITIES
Authors propose the next penetration tests. As above 
mentioned, only verification biometric systems have been 
considered (A.VERIFICATION). 
A.  Penetration test for V.SYNTHETIC and V.IMITATION 
vulnerabilities 
Before this test can be performed and as generic 
considerations during its achievement: 
 It is necessary to have samples of genuine users.  
 All kind of potential synthetic/imitation samples must 
be evaluated. 
 All results must show a description of how fake 
samples have been generated and which materials 
are needed. 
 Fake sample enrolments must not be used for the 
remaining phases of the evaluation process.   
Test procedure entitles the following steps: 
1) Enrol a genuine user. 
2) Make synthetic/imitation sample from this user. 
3) Analyse enrolment process: Evaluator has to start an 
enrolment process and present synthetic/imitation 
sample to biometric capture sensor.  
If evaluator could get enrolled with such sample, test 
result is that sensor and/or biometric system have not 
implemented an aliveness detection method at 
enrolment phase. 
On the other hand, if evaluator could not get to enrol 
with this fake sample or if a FTE (Failure To Enrol) 
error is given back, test result to save is that sensor 
and/or biometric system have implemented methods 
that can detect this fake at enrolment.  
4) Analyse verification process: Evaluator has to start a 
verification claiming genuine user identity and 
present his/her synthetic/imitation sample to 
biometric capture sensor. At this point two things may 
happen:  
- A FTA (Failure To Acquisition) error is returned 
because sensor does not capture fake biometric 
reference. Test result for this case is that sensor 
and/or biometric system have implemented methods 
for aliveness detection at verification.  
- Biometric sensor permits synthetic/imitation sample 
capture. 
a) Evaluator does not get a successful verification. 
Test result is that sensor and/or biometric 
system have implemented aliveness detection 
methods that can reject this attack at verification.  
b) On the contrary, if evaluator gets that biometric 
system accepts, test result is that sensor and/or 
biometric system have not implemented an 
aliveness detection method that can reject this 
kind of synthetic/imitation samples at verification 
process.  
5) Results of different phases have to be recorded. 
B.  Penetration test for V.DEAD vulnerability 
Before this test can be performed and as generic 
considerations during its achievement: 
 Two kinds of samples have to be tested: current 
amputate samples and dead samples. 
 Procedures change depending on whether it is 
possible to enrol a live sample previously or not. 
 Dead/amputate sample enrolment must not be used 
for the remaining phases of evaluation process. 
A procedure with previous enrolment entitles evaluators to 
follow the following steps: 
1) Perform an enrolment with a live biometric reference. 
2) Obtain dead/amputate sample from the user 
enrolled. 
3) Analyse enrolment process: In an analogue way as in 
the penetration test for V.SYNTHETIC AND 
V.IMITATION vulnerabilities.  
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4) Analyse verification process: As in the penetration 
test for V.SYNTHETIC AND V.IMITATION 
vulnerabilities.  
5) Results of different phases have to be recorded.  
A procedure without previous enrolment entitles that 
evaluators do the following stages: 
1) Obtain dead/amputate sample from the user enrol 
previously. 
2) Analyse enrolment process: In an analogue way as in 
the penetration test for V.SYNTHETIC AND 
V.IMITATION vulnerabilities. 
3) Verification process cannot be evaluated because 
live biometric reference has not been previously 
enrolled in the system.  
4) Results of different phases have to be recorded. 
C.  Penetration test for V.LATENT vulnerability 
Before this test can be performed and as generic 
considerations during its achievement: 
 It is necessary to have samples of genuine users.  
 All kind of potential reactivation methods must be 
evaluated. 
 All results must show a description of how to 
reactivate latent samples. 
 Latent sample enrolment must not be used for the 
remaining phases of the evaluation process. 
Test procedure entitles that evaluators follow the next steps: 
1) Perform an enrolment of a genuine user. 
2) Verify the same user in order to check if previous 
enrolment has been done correctly. 
3) Perform a new presentation of this biometric 
reference and assure whether this latent information 
is held on the sensor. 
4) Analyse enrolment process: Evaluator has to start an 
enrolment process and reactivate latent sample. 
Evaluation is performed in the same way as in 
previous penetration tests.  
5) Perform a new presentation of genuine biometric 
reference again and assure that latent information is 
held in the sensor. 
6) Analyse verification process: Evaluator has to start a 
verification claiming genuine user identity and 
reactivate biometric sample. Evaluation is performed 
in an analogue way as in previous penetration tests.  
7) The results of different phases have to be stored.  
VII.  EVALUATION RESULTS
After all penetration tests previously mentioned have been 
defined, reports have to be generated. As sensors and 
vulnerabilities have already been described, only results 
obtained will be detailed in this section. In order to keep 
confidentiality on the sensors tested, results will be given 
without reference to the specific sensor. This does not limit the 
interest of this paper, because this work is dealing with the 
methodology, but not with the particular results of particular 
sensors. 
But what is of great interest is the description of the samples 
used and the way those were created. Therefore this will be 
explained first, leaving the overview of results for the last part 
of this section. Before giving those and a brief description of 
samples and how to create them will be detailed. Such results 
are presented at the following tables. 
A.  Vascular Pattern 
TABLE X 
V.IMITATION SAMPLES FOR VASCULAR BIOMETRICS
SAMPLE 
A sheet of paper with a palm-vein pattern 
printed.
Paper: DIN A4  
Printer: HP 1200 LaserJet 
PROCESS 
TO CREATE  
Intercepting captured image and post-
processing with image processing software. 
Finally image is printed. 
Sheet of paper is presented to the system. 
TABLE XI 
V.DEAD SAMPLES FOR VASCULAR BIOMETRICS
Procedure with previous live enrolment 
SAMPLE 
Due to authors do not get a dead or 
amputate sample, this has been simulated 
taking out blood of the hand.  
PROCESS 
TO CREATE 
Following surgery techniques, we used a 
blood pressure measure instrument to press 
arm in order to avoid blood come in to the 
hand. After we covered hand with an elastic 
band until taking out all blood.  
Then that body is presented to the system 
B.  Fingerprint 
TABLE XII 
V.IMITATION SAMPLES FOR FINGERPRINTS
SAMPLE 1 Gummy Finger [2] 
PROCESS 
TO CREATE 
We made a fingerprint mould with silicone 
rubber. Then we boiled water and added 
solid gelatine. When it was liquid, we put it 
into the mould. Later, we put this mould into 
a refrigerator and when sample was solid, 
we put out of the mould [2].  
SAMPLE 2 Resine Finger 
PROCESS 
TO CREATE 
This sample was made by an special effects 
expert. He made the mould with alginate of 
dentist and then used resin to create finger. 
TABLE XIII 
V.DEAD SAMPLES FOR FINGERPRINTS
V.DEAD (Procedure with previous live enrolment) 
SAMPLE 
Authors did not get a dead or amputate 
finger, therefore this has been simulated 
taking out blood of the finger as we 
mentioned previously for vascular modality. 
PROCESS 
TO CREATE 
Again following surgery techniques, we 
used a blood pressure measure instrument 
to press arm in order to avoid blood come 
into the hand and fingers. After, we covered 
finger with an elastic band until taking out all 
blood.  
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TABLE XIV 
V.LATENT SAMPLES FOR FINGERPRINTS
SAMPLE Previous genuine user 
PROCESS 
TO CREATE 
We breathed out to sensor in order to 
reactivate latent sample.  
C.  Overall results 
Unfortunately results were not as good as expected. All 
sensors presented some kind of fail to some of the tests 
performed. Some of the failures showed that with little 
adjustments sensor can pass the test, while other failures 
seem to be far from reaching a solution. 
In is a fact to worry about, that although Matsumoto's work 
on gummy fingers is from 2002, in 2008 there are still some 
sensors that can fail such test. 
As already mentioned, not detailed results can be published, 
not even the good ones, due to confidentiality reasons. But the 
most important result of this paper, is that the methodology 
developed works, and it is clearly defined to be used in CC 
evaluations. 
VIII.  CONCLUSIONS
Biometric systems could be attacked by means of 
presenting fake, dead or latent samples. This vulnerability can 
be counteracted if acquisition devices and/or process 
algorithms have implemented aliveness detection methods. 
In this paper, authors have defined a general methodology 
based on analysis of vulnerabilities specified at CEM to 
evaluate if current commercial sensors and biometric systems 
have included such methods. Such methodology begins 
analyzing potential threats and vulnerabilities. Then it 
describes penetration tests for those vulnerabilities that are 
considered exploitable. 
This methodology has been placed into action with several 
sensors from different modalities (vascular and fingerprint). 
Results have disclosed that there are still some test where 
sensors fail, but that the methodology presented is valid and 
applicable. 
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